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Abstract: On December 6, 2017, the European Commission published a set of proposals to 
reform the euro area. These proposals include, inter alia, the creation of a post of European 
Finance minister, a euro area budget-line and the establishment of a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF). The latter will be at the centre of this article. The Commission does not intend 
to set up the EMF anew from scratch. Rather, the new EMF is to be built on the well-
established structure of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The new EMF will thus 
succeed to and replace the ESM, with the latter’s current financial and institutional structure 
essentially preserved. However, the new institution will also take on a number of additional 
functions, such as providing a financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), 
enhanced monitoring tasks and the responsibility to report regularly to the European 
Parliament. But will these changes make EMU more efficient, coherent and democratic? And 
has the EU the competence to establish such a mechanism at all? The objective of this article 
is to answer these complex questions. 
Keywords: EU Law, Economic and Monetary Union, Eurozone crisis, Reform proposals. 
I. Introduction  
The banners at the entrance to the Bank of Greece museum in Athens promise a ‘fascinating 
journey through Greece’s economic and monetary history. Inside the museum ranks of glass cases 
enclose an array of coins and old bank notes, as well as the paraphernalia used to make them. The 
bills range from 5 drachma up to 100 million drachma, a reminder that Greece has had problems 
with inflation in the past. The end of history, at least for this exhibition, is 2001 when Greece 
adopted the euro. But the country’s present troubles suggest an important chapter to the story of 
Greek money is still to be written. Some reckon the drachma may roll off the presses again’.1  
In order to prevent that from happening a number of measures have been taken both by the EU 
and the euro area Member States. For instance, major bail-out mechanisms were established – the 
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1 Greece and the euro - An economy crumbles, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543522 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
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EFSF2 and the EFSM3 – worth several hundred billion euros. Later in 2011, the so-called six-pack 
measures were enacted, introducing a macroeconomic surveillance mechanism and better 
budgetary surveillance. 2012 then saw the signing of the ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union’ - commonly referred to as the Fiscal Compact. 
The latter aims to complement the six-pack measures by obliging states to introduce so called 
‘debt-brakes’.  
However, all these measures have not yet brought about the desired effect. The biggest flaw in the 
EU’s strategy thus far has been that it sought ‘to muddle through the sovereign-debt crisis rather 
than get on top of it’.4 The establishment of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 
2012 was supposed to put an end to this ‘muddling through’ strategy and provide a solid, clearly 
structured mechanism to prevent future crises. But the ‘big bazooka’5 – as it is sometimes referred 
to – also suffers from a fundamental flaw: It constitutes an anomaly in the EU system insofar as it 
is an intergovernmental institution based on an international treaty between the nineteen euro 
area Member States and not an EU institution. At the same time it is – at least to a certain extent - 
integrated into the institutional framework of the EU: For instance, the ECJ is tasked with solving 
disputes between the ESM and ESM Member States. This ‘partial involvement’ of EU institutions in 
an intergovernmental mechanism has generated a ‘complex landscape where judicial protection, 
respect of fundamental rights and democratic accountability are fragmented and unevenly 
implemented’.6  
All in all, this created a bizarre and opaque situation. On December 6, 2017, the Commission 
therefore proposed to integrate – as part of a comprehensive EMU reform package – the ESM into 
the EU legal framework. In the course of this process the ESM should also be given additional tasks 
and be renamed European Monetary Fund (EMF). But will these changes finally put an end to the 
‘muddling through’ strategy? Will they achieve the objectives set, i.e. making EMU more efficient, 
coherent and democratic? And – on a more practical note - has the EU the competence to establish 
such a mechanism at all?  
In order to answer these complex questions, this article will be structured as follows: 
(1) It will first analyse the main features of the new EMF.  
(2) It will then set out the rationale for integrating the new mechanism into the EU legal 
framework.  
(3) Having done so, it will then examine whether such integration is legally possible. In other 
words, it will analyse whether the EU has the competence to establish such a mechanism.  
(4) It will then critically examine whether the new EMF will actually make EMU more efficient 
and democratic.  
                                                 
2 EFSF is the abbreviation used for the ‘European Financial Stability Facility’. 
3 EFSM is the abbreviation used for the ‘European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism’. 
4 Hopes raised, punches pulled, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10 2012), available at 
https://www.economist.com/node/18114793 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).  
5 Mario Draghi: the man behind Europe's 'big bazooka', THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 29, 2012, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9113256/Mario-Draghi-the-man-behind-Europes-big-
bazooka.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
6 Cf. Proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of a European Monetary Fund, COM (2017) 827 final 
(Dec. 6, 2017) at 3.  
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II. The Main Features of the New EMF 
As already mentioned above, the Commission does not intend to set up the EMF anew from 
scratch. Rather, the new EMF is to be built on the well-established structure of the ESM.7 Hence, a 
brief overview of the main elements of the ESM is in order before we turn to the changes 
introduced by the Commission proposal. 
A. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The contours of the ESM, the facility, which took over from the EFSF in 2012, were first revealed at 
the European Council meeting on March 24-25, 2011, and later specified in the ESM Treaty (ESMT).  
1. Function 
The purpose of the ESM is similar to that of the EFSF, namely to reduce instability in the euro area 
by providing financial assistance to its Member States under strict conditionality.8 Yet despite this 
similar function, the ESM differs significantly from the EFSF in a number of respects as outlined 
below. 
2. Legal Nature, Institutional Structure and Governance 
In contrast to the EFSF, which had been established as a private company (a société anonyme 
under Luxembourg law)9, the ESM was established as an intergovernmental organisation on the 
basis of a treaty (the ESM-Treaty) between the euro area Member States. This international treaty 
was signed by the Heads of State and Government of the euro area on February 2, 2012 and 
subsequently ratified by national parliaments.10 It eventually entered into force on September 27, 
2012.  
The institutional structure of the ESM is based on two pillars: The Board of Governors and the 
Board of Directors: 
 Board of Governors. The key decision-making body of the ESM is the Board of Governors 
(BoG). It is consists of the euro area Finance Ministers as voting members, while the European 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB may also 
participate in the meetings of the BoG but only on an observer basis.11 ‘Other persons, including 
                                                 
7 In legal terms, it will succeed to and replace the ESM, including in its legal position, with all its rights and 
obligations. 
8 See Article 3 of the ESM Treaty (ESMT), available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.-en12.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2019), which provides: “The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding 
and provide stability support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument 
chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, 
if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States. For this 
purpose, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or 
other agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other third parties.” 
9 See European Financial Stability Facility, Articles of Association, Article 1(1), available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_articles_of_incorporation_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
10 Membership in the ESM shall be open to the other Member States of the EU once they meet the criteria for joining 
the euro area and their ‘derogation’ status is abrogated, Article 2(1) ESMT.  
11 Conclusions of the European Council of 24/25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 123, 22. See also Article 5 (3) ESMT. 
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representatives of organisations, such as the IMF, may be invited [...] to attend meetings as 
observers on an ad hoc basis’.12 
The BoG is the highest decision making body of the ESM.13 Initially it was envisaged that the BoG 
would decide on (a) the granting of financial assistance, (b) the terms and conditions of financial 
assistance, (c) the lending capacity of the ESM and (d) changes to the menu of instruments et seq. 
only by mutual agreement14 given the far-reaching implications of these decisions. Yet, the voting 
rules were later modified to make sure that the ‘ESM is in a position to take the necessary decisions 
in all circumstances’.15 Against the backdrop of the escalating crisis, an emergency procedure was 
included.16 In case of such an emergency, the mutual agreement rule will be replaced by a qualified 
majority of 85%, whereby voting weights will be proportional to the Member States’ respective 
capital subscriptions to the ESM.17  Board of Directors. In addition to the Board of 
Governors, there will be a second decision-making body - the so-called Board of Directors. It will 
be ‘responsible for specific tasks delegated by the Board of Governors. Each euro area country will 
appoint one Director and one alternate Director, with the European Commission and the ECB as 
observers. A Managing Director responsible for the day-to-day management of the ESM will chair 
the Board of Directors’.18 Decisions by the Board of Directors will be taken by qualified majority, 
unless stated otherwise.19  
3. Capital Structure 
The ESM has a total subscribed capital of € 704,8 bn., of which € 80,5 bn. is in the form of paid-in 
capital provided by the euro area Member States’.20 The remaining € 624,3 bn. will be provided by 
euro area Member States in the form of callable capital. Although the ESM’s capital base will thus 
(nominally) amount to € 704,8 bn., its effective lending capacity will only be around € 500 bn., giving 
the facility a security buffer of 40%. This significant level of over-collateralisation is supposed to 
help the ESM achieve the best credit rating (AAA).  
Each State’s share in the ESM will be based on its respective participation in the ECB’s paid-in 
capital. Hence, Germany, with a share of 27% of ECB capital, will contribute € 21,7 billion.21 In 
addition, Germany’s share of callable capital will amount to € 168,3 bn.22 Smaller states, such as 
Finland, with a share of 1,8% of ECB capital, will contribute € 1,4 bn. in paid-in capital and € 11,1 
                                                 
12 Article 5(5) ESMT. 
13 Conclusions of the European Council of 24/25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 123, 23. 
14 See Article 5(6) ESMT. The term ‘mutual agreement’ is defined in Article 4(3) ESMT: ‘The adoption of a decision by 
mutual agreement requires the unanimity of the members participating in the vote. Abstentions do not prevent 
the adoption of a decision by mutual agreement’. 
15 Statement by the euro area Heads of State or Government, Dec. 9, 2011, 6.  
16 An emergency exists, ‘if the Commission and the ECB both conclude that a failure to urgently adopt a decision to 
grant or implement financial assistance [...] would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro 
area’, Article 4(4) ESMT. 
17 See Article 4(4) ESMT. It should be noted that the emergency procedure only applies in the cases of Articles 13 – 
18 ESMT, see Article 5(6) ESMT.  
18 ECB, The European Stability Mechanism, EBC Monthly Bulletin July 2011, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp71-84en.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
19 Article 6(5) ESMT. 
20 European Council Summit Conclusions 24/25 March 2011, 24.  
21 See Annex 1 and 2 of the ESMT.  
22 See Annex 1 and 2 of the ESMT.  
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bn. in the form of callable capital and guarantees.23 Last but not least, states in which GDP per 
capita is less than 75% of the EU average are given a discount in the first twelve years of their 
membership in the euro area.24  
In light of the ESM’s strong capital backing (i.e. the combination of paid-in capital and callable 
capital) credit enhancements, such as the ones put in place under the EFSF due to its structure of 
guarantees only, will no longer be required.  
4. Instruments 
As outlined above, the purpose of the ESM is to reduce instability in the euro area by providing 
financial assistance to its Member States. The financial assistance envisaged under the ESM Treaty 
can take the form of:  
 Loan disbursements25 
 Precautionary facilities26 
 Facilities to finance the recapitalisation of banks27  
 Facilities for the purchase of bonds in the secondary markets28 
 Facilities for the purchase of bonds in the primary markets29 
Financial assistance will normally be granted in the form of a loan to an ESM Member State. Such 
loans are subject to strict conditionality: ‘The conditionality attached to the ESM loans shall be 
contained in a macro-economic adjustment programme detailed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), in accordance with Article 13(3)’.30 The financial terms of each ESM loan on 
the other hand will be specified in a separate financial assistance facility agreement. Other 
instruments include precautionary facilities,31 facilities to finance the recapitalisation of banks,32 
facilities for the purchase of bonds in the secondary markets and facilities for the purchase of 
bonds in the primary markets. It should be noted that the Board of Governors may from time to 
time review the list of financial assistance instruments and decide to amend it.33 However, such 
amendments require mutual agreement.34 
                                                 
23 See Annex 1 and 2 of the ESMT.  
24 See European Council Summit Conclusions 24/25 March 2011, 34. 
25 See Article 16 ESMT.  
26 See Article 14 ESMT. 
27 See Article 15 ESMT. 
28 See Article 18 ESMT. 
29 See Article 17 ESMT.  
30 Article 16(2) ESMT.  
31 See Article 14 ESMT. 
32 See Article 15 ESMT. 
33 See Article 19 ESMT. 
34 Article 5(6)(i) ESMT. 
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5. Procedure 
The financial support outlined above will follow a complex procedure, starting with the request by 
a Member State for financial assistance. This request is to be addressed to the chairperson of the 
ESM’s Board of Governors.35  
Assessment. Following this request, the Commission, in liaison with the ECB/IMF, will assess three 
aspects: (1) whether there is a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and (2) 
whether public debt in the respective Member State is sustainable. 36  ‘If, on the basis of the 
sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment programme can 
realistically restore public debt to a sustainable level, the Commission will then assess (3) the actual 
financing needs of the respective state’.37  
Negotiation. Based on this assessment, the BoG shall then entrust the Commission38 to negotiate 
a macroeconomic adjustment programme, the details of which will be set out in a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU).39  This MoU shall specify the conditionality attached to the financial 
assistance and be fully consistent with the overall EU framework for economic policy 
coordination.40 At the same time, the Managing Director of the ESM will prepare a draft financial 
assistance agreement, specifying the complex financial terms and conditions.41  
Signature and approval. The MoU will be signed by the Commission on behalf of the ESM, subject 
to prior approval by the Board of Governors.42 ‘The Board of Directors shall then approve the 
financial assistance facility agreement detailing the financial aspects of the stability support to be 
granted’.43 
Surveillance. Once the first tranche of financial assistance has been disbursed, the Commission – 
together with the ECB and the IMF – will monitor compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment 
programme.44  
6. Dispute Settlement  
In case of a dispute between an ESM Member State and the ESM regarding the interpretation or 
application of the ESM Treaty, the dispute shall first be submitted to the Board of Governors for 
decision.45 Only if the ESM Member State contests the BoG’s decision, will the dispute be submitted 
to the ECJ.46 The ECJ’s judgment shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the ECJ.47 
Such a delegation of jurisdiction is possible under Article 273 TFEU, but is not without problems: 
                                                 
35 Article 13(1) ESMT. 
36 Article 13(1)(a)-(b) ESMT.  
37 ECB, The European Stability Mechanism, EBC Monthly Bulletin July 2011, 77. See also Article 13(1)(c) ESMT. 
38 Together with the IMF and the ECB.  
39 ECB, The European Stability Mechanism, EBC Monthly Bulletin July 2011, 77. See also Article 13(3) ESMT. 
40 Article 13(3) ESMT.  
41 Article 13(3) ESMT. 
42 Article 13(4) ESMT. 
43 Article 13(5) ESMT. 
44 Article 13(7) ESMT. 
45 Article 37(2) ESMT. 
46 Article 37(2) ESMT. 
47 Article 37 ESMT. 
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This ‘partial involvement’ of EU institutions, such as the ECJ, in an intergovernmental mechanism 
has generated a ‘complex landscape where judicial protection, respect of fundamental rights and 
democratic accountability are fragmented and unevenly implemented’.48 This has led to frequent 
calls for reforms, which were eventually heeded in late 2017.  
B. Transforming the ESM into an EMF – the Key Changes 
On 6 December 2017, the Commission published a set of proposals to reform the euro area. These 
proposals include, inter alia, the creation of a post of European Finance Minister, a euro area 
budget-line, the integration of the fiscal compact into the Union legal framework and the 
establishment of a European Monetary Fund. The latter will be at the centre of this section. The 
Commission does not intend to set up the EMF anew from scratch. Rather, the new EMF is to be 
built on the well-established structure of the ESM.49 The new EMF will thus succeed to and replace 
the ESM,50  with the latter’s current financial and institutional structure essentially preserve.51 
However, the new institution will also take on a number of additional responsibilities/functions. 
Moreover, some further modifications are necessitated by the integration of the mechanism into 
the EU legal framework. These are set out in the Draft Statute of the EMF52 annexed to the Draft 
Regulation on the establishment of the EMF and will be analysed in the next section. 
1. The Key Changes 
a. Negotiating and Monitoring Reform Programmes 
So far negotiating reform programmes and monitoring compliance was the task of ‘the 
institutions’, i.e. the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. Under the new proposal, the IMF – despite 
its long-standing experience – will no longer be involved. All references to the IMF are deleted in 
the new draft. Interestingly, the role exercised so far by the IMF is not passed on to the EMF. Rather 
‘conditionality is for the Commission to keep. According to Article 13 of the draft EMF statute, 
conditionality is negotiated by the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and ‘in cooperation with 
the EMF’. ‘Cooperation’ is admittedly a very weak form of involvement, especially if it is compared 
with the phrase ‘together with’ that previously described IMF involvement under the ESM Treaty. 
Moreover, MoUs shall be signed by both the Commission and the EMF. In contrast, under the ESM 
Treaty, MoUs where signed by the Commission ‘on behalf’ of the ESM. The phrase ‘on behalf’, 
establishing an agent-principal relation between the Commission and the ESM, is now deleted, 
meaning that the Commission becomes legally a co-owner of EMF conditionality. Finally, under the 
                                                 
48 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, 3.  
49 In legal terms, it will succeed to and replace the ESM, including in its legal position, with all its rights and 
obligations. 
50 See Article 2(1) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 26; Article 2(1) provides: ‘The EMF shall succeed to and 
replace the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), including its legal position and assuming all rights and 
obligations. [...].’ 
51 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 5. 
52 The Statute of the EMF forms an integral part of the Regulation, see Article 1(2) of said Regulation. 
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proposed EMF statute, compliance with conditionality is monitored solely by the Commission, in 
liaison with the ECB. No role is explicitly provided for the EMF in this critical phase’.53 
In conclusion, the proposed changes significantly strengthen the role of the European Commission. 
Given the latter’s self-perception as an increasingly political actor, it is likely that we will see a 
softening of reform conditions in the future due to political compromises.54  
b. Common Backstop to the SRF/Lender of Last Resort 
The EMF would also take over certain functions in the banking union. It would provide the common 
backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and act as a lender of last resort in order to facilitate 
the orderly resolution of distressed banks. For this purpose, the EMF will be able to provide credit 
lines or guarantees to secure measures by the Single Resolution Board (SRB).55 In this way, the EMF 
will supplement the system of financing the orderly resolution of banks in the banking union: The 
‘liability cascade’ put in place envisages a primary liability of shareholders and creditors (‘bail-in’). 
If that proves insufficient, then the SRF, worth € 55 bn. and financed by bank levies, will be 
activated. Only if the SRF proves insufficient, too, then recourse to the EMF as ultima ratio would 
be possible. The proposed EMF instrument thus implements the options of the SRB already set out 
in Article 74 of Regulation 806/2014. Pursuant to Article 74, the SRB shall ‘where the amounts raised 
or available in accordance with Articles 70 and 71 are not sufficient to meet the Funds' obligations 
… contract for the fund financial arrangements, including, where possible, public financial 
arrangements, regarding the immediate availability of additional financial means to be used in 
accordance with Article 76 …’.56  
In sum, the EMF would provide the common last-resort backstop to the SRF. The underlying 
rationale is to provide ‘enhanced confidence to all parties concerned with regard to the credibility 
of the actions to be taken by the SRB and to increase the capacity of the SRF’.57 
c. Changes to the Decision-Making Mechanism  
In terms of governance, the Commission proposal includes the possibility for faster decision 
making in certain situations. For instance, a so-called reinforced qualified majority, which requires 
85% of the votes, suffices for specific decisions on stability support, disbursements and the 
deployment of the financial backstop. However, unanimity voting will be kept for all major 
decisions with financial impact, such as capital calls.  
These new voting rules deserve a closer examination. They are set out in Article 4 of the draft 
statute of the EMF: 
(…) 
                                                 
53 Michael Ioannidis, Towards a European Monetary Fund: Comments on the Commission’s Proposal, EU Law 
Analysis Blog, Jan. 31, 2018, available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.de/2018/01/towards-european-monetary-
fund-comments.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).  
54 The non-participation of the IMF in the future only serves to underline this impression.  
55 See Article 22(1) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, European Commission, ANNEX to the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund, COM (2017) 827 final (Dec. 6, 2017), at 13. 
56 Article 74, Regulation 806/2014. 
57 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 4. 
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2. The decisions of the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors shall be taken by unanimity, 
reinforced qualified majority, qualified majority or simple majority as specified in this Regulation. 
In respect of all decisions, a quorum of two thirds of the EMF Members with voting rights 
representing at least two thirds of the voting rights must be present.  
3. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of a 
decision requiring unanimity. 
4. The adoption of a decision by reinforced qualified majority requires 85% of the votes cast.  
5. The adoption of a decision by qualified majority requires 80% of the votes cast.  
6. The adoption of a decision by simple majority requires a majority of the votes cast. 
7. The voting rights of each EMF Member, as exercised by its representative on the Board of 
Governors or Board of Directors, shall be equal to the number of shares allocated to it in the 
authorised capital stock of the EMF. (…)’.58 
Articles 4(2) and 4(4) thus introduce a reinforced qualified majority, which requires 85% of the votes 
cast. According to Article 5(7), the Board of Governors shall take the following decisions by such a 
reinforced qualified majority: 
(…) 
(a) provide stability support to EMF Members, including the policy conditions as stated in the 
memorandum of understanding referred to in Article 13(3), and to establish the choice of 
instruments and the financial terms and conditions, in accordance with Articles 14 to 18; 
(b) request the Commission to negotiate, in liaison with the ECB, the economic policy conditions 
attached to each financial assistance, in accordance with Article 13(3);  
(c) change the pricing policy and pricing guideline for financial assistance, in accordance with Article 
20.59 
In other words, fundamental decisions by the EMF, such as the provision of stability support no 
longer require a unanimous vote as was the case under the old Article 5(6)(f) ESMT; rather a 
reinforced qualified majority will suffice in the future. The same is true for the decision to request 
the Commission to negotiate the economic policy conditions attached to each financial assistance, 
as well as for the decision to change the pricing policy for financial assistance.60 
Conditions are lowered even further under the new emergency procedure set out in Article 3(2) of 
the draft Regulation. It provides: 
(2) Where circumstances require the urgent provision of stability support to an EMF Member in 
accordance with Article 16, decisions may be taken by an emergency procedure. In such an event, 
the decision taken by the Board of Governors or the Board of Directors shall be transmitted to the 
Council immediately after its adoption together with the reasons on which it is based. Upon 
request of the Chairperson, the Council shall discuss the decision, within 24 hours of its 
                                                 
58 Article 4(2)-(8) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 2. 
59 Article 5(7)(a)-(c) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 3. 
60 See Article 5(7)(b)-(c) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 3.  
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transmission. The Council may object to the decision. In the event of an objection, the Council may 
itself adopt another decision on the matter, or refer the matter back to the Board of Governors for 
another decision.  
[…] 
(4) Where the Council acts in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2, [...] the votes of members of the 
Council representing Member States whose currency is not the euro shall be suspended. A 
qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3) TFEU.61 
In other words, if the Council objects to a decision made by the Board of Governors, it can adopt 
another (diverging) decision on the matter. This decision is made on the basis of the qualified 
majority rules of Article 238(3) TFEU (55%/65%).62 
In summary, under the old system unanimity used to be the rule, whereas the 85% threshold was 
the exception (‘emergency procedure’). In contrast, under the new system, the 85% threshold 
becomes the rule and the new exception for emergency cases lowers requirements even further 
(55%/65%).  
d. Modified Conditions for Activating Stability Support 
Moreover, the Commission proposal modifies the conditions under which stability support can be 
activated. Article 12(1) of the draft statute stipulates that the EMF may provide stability support if 
this is ‘indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area or of its Member States’. 
In contrast, under the old ESM Treaty such support could only be provided if necessary ‘to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States’.63 Although 
only four words have been changed, the implications of this modification should not be 
underestimated. In the future, financial support could thus be provided even if it is only the 
financial stability of a single Member State that is in danger, while so far the stability of the euro 
area as a whole had to be at stake. Such a softening of the conditions for stability support might 
increase the incentives for moral hazard by individual Member States. 
2. Conclusion: ‘Honni soit qui mal y pense’ 
In conclusion, the draft proposal contains a plethora of changes. Apart from the provisions on the 
common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), these changes are often difficult to detect 
– sometimes only a few words are changed and sometimes they result from complex cross-
reference. Hence, one is left guessing: Is this a case of suboptimal legal drafting or a deliberate 
strategy?  
III. Integrating the ESM into the EU legal framework – a critical analysis 
                                                 
61 Article 3(2) and 3(4) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 27. 
62 Note that the votes of the members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is not the euro 
shall be suspended, see Article 3(4) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 5. 
63 Articles 3 and 12 ESMT. 
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This section will critically analyse the proposed integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework. 
In particular, it will examine the rationale for integrating the ESM into the framework of the 
European Treaties. It will then analyse whether such integration is legally possible - in other words, 
whether the EU has a competence to do so. Finally, it will turn to the wider implications of such 
integration.  
A. The Rationale for Integrating the ESM into the EU Legal Framework  
So far the ESM constitutes an anomaly in the EU system. It is an intergovernmental institution 
based on an international treaty between the nineteen euro area Member States rather than an 
EU institution. At the same time it is – at least to a certain extent - integrated into the institutional 
framework of the EU: For instance, the ECJ is tasked with solving disputes between the ESM and an 
ESM Member or between ESM Members.64 Such a conferral of jurisdiction is possible under Article 
273 TFEU. Moreover, the Council must approve macroeconomic adjustment programmes 
negotiated within the framework of an ESM-programme, before the respective ESM bodies can 
adopt it formally.  
The ESM was also authorised by its Member States to delegate certain tasks to other European 
institutions, such as the Commission and the ECB.65 For instance, the Commission is responsible 
for (a) negotiating the conditions and (b) monitoring compliance with the macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes. This ‘partial involvement’ of EU institutions in an intergovernmental 
mechanism has generated a ‘complex landscape where judicial protection, respect of fundamental 
rights and democratic accountability are fragmented and unevenly implemented’.66 This created a 
bizarre and opaque situation. Hence, the underlying idea of ‘integrating the ESM into the Union 
legal framework’ is to end this anomaly and make the institutional structure of EMU more 
coherent. European issues, in particular those with a direct reference to the euro area, should be 
dealt with in the EU Treaties. Otherwise we will see a further fragmentation of legal sources, which 
will eventually reduce transparency and legitimacy. In the long run, such fragmentation could also 
weaken European institutions and the EU in general.  
From a practical perspective, integrating the ESM into the EU legal framework also has a number 
of advantages: For instance, EU institutions could be directly involved in the daily operations of the 
ESM; recourse to the complex concept of ‘Organleihe’ would therefore no longer be necessary. 
Moreover, ESM personnel would be subject to the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions 
of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union. This would clarify their status and 
simplify their mobility between the European institutions. Perhaps even more important, the 
integrated ESM would be fully subjected to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, while so far the latter could 
only exercise limited jurisdiction over the ESM.67 
                                                 
64 See Article 37(3) ESMT. 
65 See Council Document 12114/11 of 24 June 2011 which provides: ‘The representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States of the European Union agree that the ESM Treaty include provisions for the European Commission 
and the European Central Bank to carry out the tasks as set out in that Treaty’.  
66 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 3.  
67 See Article 37(3) ESMT. 
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In summary, the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework would make the institutional 
structure of EMU more coherent and transparent. It would end an anomalous situation that 
resulted from ‘a patchwork of decisions taken to face an unprecedented crisis’.68 
B. The Competence for Integrating the ESM into the EU Legal Framework 
One of the fundamental principles of EU law is the principle of conferral established in Article 5(2) 
TEU. Under this principle, the EU shall only act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
the Member States in the Treaties. It highlights that the EU – as a supranational institution – lacks 
a so-called ‘competence-competence’, i.e. a power to create its own competences (this 
jurisprudential doctrine is often referred to by using the German term ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’). 
Practically speaking this means that the EU – whenever enacting a new legislative act - has to rely 
on a specific legal base in the Treaties, implied powers69 or the subsidiary competence enshrined 
in Article 352 TFEU.  
This section will therefore analyse the potential legal bases that might justify the establishment of 
the EMF.70 It will first analyse specific legal bases, such as Article 122(2) TFEU et alt. In case none of 
them applies to the case under consideration, we will turn to the subsidiary competence enshrined 
in Article 352 TFEU.  
1. Specific Legal Bases  
The issue of whether or not the EU has the power to establish a financial stability mechanism was 
addressed – albeit indirectly – by the ECJ in Pringle (2012). In this case, the ECJ held that the 
establishment of the ESM constitutes an economic policy measure. Articles 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU, 
however, restrict the role of the Union in the area of economic policy to the adoption of mere 
coordinating measures. Hence, the provisions of the TEU and the TFEU do not confer any specific 
power on the Union to establish a stability mechanism: 
 ‘… as regards whether Decision 2011/199 affects the Union’s competence in the area of the 
coordination of the Member States’ economic policies, it must be observed that, since Articles 2(3) 
and 5(1) TFEU restrict the role of the Union in the area of economic policy to the adoption of 
coordinating measures, the provisions of the TEU and TFEU do not confer any specific power on 
the Union to establish a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision 2011/199’.71 
Nonetheless, the Court goes on to examine – at least cursorily – Article 122(2) TFEU and Article 
143(2) TFEU. It quickly concludes, though, that none of them is applicable in the case at hand:  
‘Admittedly, Article 122(2) TFEU confers on the Union the power to grant ad hoc financial assistance 
to a Member State which is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused 
by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. However, as emphasised by 
the European Council in recital 4 of the preamble to Decision 2011/199, Article 122(2) TFEU does 
                                                 
68 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 3. 
69 Dogmatically speaking, ‘implied powers’ are also considered to be ‘conferred’ within the meaning of Article 5(2) 
TEU, see judgment of 31 March 1971, AETR, C 22/70, EU:C:1971:32, para. 15, 19. 
70 And hence the enactment of the underlying legislative act, i.e. the ‘Regulation on the establishment of the 
European Monetary Fund’.  
71 Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 64. 
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not constitute an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of a stability mechanism of the kind 
envisaged by that decision. The fact that the mechanism envisaged is to be permanent and that its 
objectives are to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole means that such 
action cannot be taken by the Union on the basis of that provision of the TFEU’.72 
The second provision examined - Article 143 TFEU – is not applicable either. It only allows for 
financial assistance for Member States whose currency is not the euro.73  
 In summary, none of the specific legal bases analysed can be invoked to justify the 
establishment of the EMF. Hence, recourse to the subsidiary competence under Article 352 TFEU 
is possible.74  
2. Article 352 TFEU 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the European Commission bases its proposal for a Council 
Regulation on Article 352 TFEU. This article – often referred to as the ‘flexibility clause’ - stipulates:  
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. 
Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament. 
In other words, for Article 352 TFEU to apply, the following conditions must be met: (a) the measure 
must be within the framework of EU policies; (b) the envisaged measure must be necessary (c) to 
attain one of the EU’s objectives; (d) no specific legal basis exists in the treaties (‘subsidiarity’). We 
will now examine whether these conditions are met in the case under consideration. 
a. Within the Framework of Union Policies  
First of all, the establishment of the EMF must constitute an action by the Union within the 
framework of the policies defined in the treaties. This is undoubtedly the case. The ECJ has already 
decided in Pringle (see above) that the establishment of a stability mechanism is an economic 
policy measure, which falls within the scope of application of the EU Treaties (see Article 120 TFEU 
et seq.):  
‘In the light of the objectives to be attained by the stability mechanism the establishment of which 
is envisaged by Article 1 of Decision 2011/199, the instruments provided in order to achieve those 
objectives and the close link between that mechanism, the provisions of the TFEU relating to 
economic policy and the regulatory framework for strengthened economic governance of the 
                                                 
72 Id. para. 65. 
73 The ECJ held: ‘Further, even if Article 143(2) TFEU also enables the Union, subject to certain conditions, to grant 
mutual assistance to a Member State, that provision covers only Member States whose currency is not the euro’, 
Case C-370/12, supra note 71, para. 66. 
74 Implied powers are evidently not applicable in the case under consideration. 
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Union, it must be concluded that the establishment of that mechanism falls within the area of 
economic policy’. 75 
b. Attainment of an EU Objective 
Moreover, the measure must be necessary to attain one of the objectives of the EU. In the case 
under consideration, the objective to be attained is the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union whose currency is the euro, Article 3(4) TEU. But is the establishment of a EMF 
really necessary to attain said objective? This question will be analysed in the next section. 
c. Necessity 
The interpretation of the term ‘necessary’ is a more complicated endeavour. Since the 
establishment of the ESM six years ago, the euro area has been equipped with a stability 
mechanism to help Member States in crisis and to safeguard stability in the euro area as a whole. 
Hence, one could argue that the establishment of the EMF by means of an EU Regulation is not 
‘necessary’ anymore.  
Or to put it more generally: Can an EU measure still be considered ‘necessary’, when the Member 
States have already taken collective measures outside the EU legal framework (e.g. the conclusion 
of an international treaty) to attain the objective?  
Some argue that in such cases EU action is no longer ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 352 
TFEU.76  In support of their view, they point to the radiating effect of the general subsidiarity 
principle as enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU. This radiating effect needs to be taken into account when 
interpreting the term ‘necessity’. Such an interpretation leads them to conclude that EU action can 
no longer be regarded as ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 352 TFEU, when the respective 
objective has already been attained by Member State measures.77 In such a case, there is no longer 
a discrepancy between the objective and the realisation of the objective.78  
Others fundamentally disagree. They argue that collective action by Member States is a clear 
indication that a uniform regulation is necessary to attain an EU objective.79 Moreover, there is a 
qualitative difference between the attainment of an objective by Member States on the one hand 
and by the EU on the other: While EU action ultimately leads to legislation that is characterised by 
the principle of supremacy and subject to uniform judicial control by the ECJ, collective action by 
the Member States results in international treaties. The latter, however, lack the above-mentioned 
characteristics and hence constitute a much weaker form of legal safeguard. Furthermore, states 
can withdraw from international treaties relatively easy and thereby escape their obligations.80  
                                                 
75 Case C-370/12, supra note 71, para. 60.  
76 See e.g., Fritz Behrens, RECHTSGRUNDLAGEN DER UMWELTPOLITIK DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 278 (1976).  
77 Ivo Schwartz, EG-Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse – insbesondere nach Artikel 235 – ausschließlich oder konkurrierend?, 
EuR 32 (1976).  
78 Behrens, supra note 76, at 278.  
79 Marcus Geiss, Art. 352 TFEU, in EU KOMMENTAR, 18 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2012). 
80 Richard H. Lauwaars, Artikel 235 als Grundlage für die flankierenden Politiken im Rahmen der Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion, EuR 104 (1976). 
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The latter approach is more convincing for the following reasons: First, there is – as outlined above 
- a qualitative difference between the attainment of an objective by Member States and by the EU. 
Moreover, the first approach suffers from dogmatic flaws: It mixes up ‘necessity’ within the 
meaning of Article 352 TFEU with the requirements of the general subsidiarity principle enshrined 
in Article 5(3) TEU. Both aspects, however, need to be clearly separated: Only once the competence 
establishing ‘necessity’ for EU action is given, can the exercise of this competence be measured 
against the general subsidiarity principle.  
 While the latter approach is generally more convincing, one must not forget that the case under 
consideration is special insofar as the Member States have acted outside the EU legal framework 
but nevertheless conferred jurisdiction upon the ECJ for certain disputes. Hence one of the key 
reasons for allowing parallel action by the EU is not given in the case under consideration. On that 
basis one might deny the existence of ‘necessity’. However, such an interpretation would ignore all 
the other essential features of EU law mentioned above. Moreover, there is the risk that Member 
States could escape their obligations by unilaterally withdrawing from the international treaty.  
In conclusion, it can therefore be argued that action by the EU is necessary in the case under 
consideration, despite the fact that the Member States have already taken measures in the form 
of the ESMT.  
d. No Specific Legal Base in the Treaties 
Given the subsidiary nature of Article 352 TFEU, it only applies when no specific legal base in the 
EU Treaties exists. As already outlined above this criterion is met in the case at hand. In Pringle, 
the ECJ held that Articles 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU restrict the role of the Union in the area of economic 
policy to the adoption of mere coordinating measures. Hence, the provisions of the TEU and the 
TFEU do not confer any specific power on the Union to establish a stability mechanism: 
 ‘[…] as regards whether Decision 2011/199 affects the Union’s competence in the area of the 
coordination of the Member States’ economic policies, it must be observed that, since Articles 2(3) 
and 5(1) TFEU restrict the role of the Union in the area of economic policy to the adoption of 
coordinating measures, the provisions of the TEU and TFEU do not confer any specific power on 
the Union to establish a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision 2011/199’.81 
e. Further Aspects: Unwritten Conditions 
According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, Article 352 TFEU also contains an unwritten condition. 
In Opinion 2/9482 the Court held, that the flexibility clause ‘being an integral part of an institutional 
system based on the principle of conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope 
of [Union] powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the [Union]. On any 
view, [Article 352] cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect would, in 
substance, be to amend the treaty without following the procedure which it provides for that 
purpose’ (Emphasis added).83 This jurisprudence was later confirmed in Opinion 2/13. Here the 
                                                 
81 Case C-370/12, supra note 71, para. 64. 
82 Opinion C-2/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. 
83 Id. para. 30. 
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Court held that accession to the ECHR ‘… would have entailed a substantial change in the existing 
Community system for the protection of human rights [...] Such a modification of the system for 
the protection of human rights in the Community, with equally fundamental institutional 
implications for the Community and for the Member States, would have been of constitutional 
significance and would therefore have been such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235 of the 
EC Treaty (which became Article 308 EC), a provision now contained in Article 352(1) TFEU, which 
could have been brought about only by way of amendment of that Treaty’.84 
Against this background, the scope of application of Article 352 TFEU needs to be restricted to 
cases of intrinsic Treaty supplementation. Hence, a distinction has to be made between admissible 
Treaty supplementation (covered by Article 352 TFEU), and inadmissible Treaty amendment 
(covered only by Article 48 TEU).85 From a dogmatic perspective, this element is regarded as a 
negative intrinsic requirement deduced by means of a teleological reduction.86  
The key question therefore is whether the envisaged integration of the ESM into the EU legal 
framework, i.e. the takeover of the ESM’s tasks by the EU, leads to a treaty amendment or a mere 
treaty supplement. This is decided by the Court on the basis of an analysis of the effects that the 
adoption of the provision would have.87 The establishment of the EMF would lead to a takeover by 
the EU of powers to safeguard financial stability in the euro area – a task so far exercised by the 
euro area Member States. This takeover would also include the transfer of the right to decide on 
the use of the financial resources provided by the euro area Member States.88 In this way, the EU’s 
coordinating competences in the field of economic policy would be substantially extended: The 
Union would henceforth be equipped with significant decision making and implementing powers 
regarding the provision of stability support. Whether such an extension of Union powers is 
compatible with the ECJ’s jurisprudence seems questionable. Indeed, it seems that a future EMF 
which employs strict (and binding) conditionality and which has the right to decide 89  on the 
provision of stability support ‘goes beyond the distribution of powers to the Union, which in the 
field of economic policy has coordinating competences only’.90  
This appears to be confirmed by earlier statements of the ECJ in Pringle, where the Court held that 
‘[…] the ESM is not concerned with the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States, 
but rather constitutes a financing mechanism. Under Articles 3 and 12(1) of the ESM Treaty, the 
purpose of the ESM is to mobilise funding and to provide financial stability support to ESM 
Members who are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems. While it is true 
that, under Article 3, Article 12(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty, the 
financial assistance provided to a Member State that is an ESM Member is subject to strict 
conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, which can take the form 
of a macro-economic adjustment programme, the conditionality prescribed nonetheless does not 
                                                 
84 Opinion C-2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 38.  
85 Matthias Rossi, Art. 352, in  EUV/AEUV KOMMENTAR, , 74 (Christian Calliess/Matthias Ruffert eds., 2016). 
86 Id. at 74. 
87 Id. at 74. 
88 For details see below, point 3.b. 
89 For details see below, point 3.b. 
90 Ioannidis, supra note 53.  
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constitute an instrument for the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States […]’ 
(Emphasis added).91 
In summary, the establishment of the EMF seems to be a case of Treaty amendment and not Treaty 
supplementation, for which Article 48 TEU would be the appropriate legal base and not Article 352 
TFEU.  
f. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it appears highly questionable whether Article 352 TFEU can be invoked as a legal 
basis for integrating the ESM into the EU legal framework. Yet not only issues of competence 
pervade the proposal. Even if the Commission nonetheless decides to go ahead with its proposal, 
it will encounter further problems as outlined in the next section.  
C. The Wider Implications of Integrating the ESM into the EU Legal Framework  
1. More Democratic? Accountability Towards the European Parliament 
One of the guiding principles of the Commission’s reform proposals was to strengthen democratic 
accountability:  
‘Completing EMU also means greater political responsibility and transparency about who decides 
what and when at the different levels. This requires bringing the European dimension of decision-
making closer to citizens and more to the forefront of national debates and making sure that both 
national parliaments and the European Parliament have sufficient powers of oversight’.92  
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the draft Regulation on the establishment of the EMF seeks to 
make the EMF accountable to the European Parliament. For instance, Article 5 of the draft 
Regulation provides that the EMF shall submit annual reports on the execution of its tasks and 
respond to oral and written questions put to it by the European Parliament. There are, however, 
‘two difficulties with such an accountability scheme. First, these are only reporting obligations and 
do not allow Parliament any influence in the actual decision-making of the EMF. Second, the 
European Parliament may not be an adequate forum for EMF accountability purposes in the first 
place. Members of the EMF are only euro area Members, but in the European Parliament all EU 
Member States are represented, not only those that have adopted the euro. The EMF is thus made 
accountable to an institution with a different composition than the Members that provide for its 
capital’. 93  Whether the proposal really contributes to making EMU more democratic is thus 
questionable.  
2. More Efficient? The New Decision-Making Procedure 
Another important objective of the Commission’s proposal was to make the EMF more efficient by 
speeding-up the decision making process. For this purpose, the draft introduces the concept of a 
reinforced qualified majority. It requires 85% of the votes cast,94 whereby the voting rights of each 
                                                 
91 Case C-370/12, supra note 71, para. 110-111. 
92 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 3. 
93 See Ioannidis,  supra note 53.  
94 See Articles 4(2) and (4) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 3. 
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Member State are equal to the number of shares allocated to it in the authorised capital stock of 
the EMF.95 Hence, large States, such as Germany hold 27% of all votes while smaller states, such as 
Austria, are only allocated 3% of the votes. 
Pursuant to Article 5(7) of the draft Statute, the Board of Governors shall take the following 
decisions by reinforced qualified majority: 
(…) 
(a) provide stability support to EMF Members, including the policy conditions as stated in the 
memorandum of understanding referred to in Article 13(3), and to establish the choice of 
instruments and the financial terms and conditions, in accordance with Articles 14 to 18; 
(b) request the Commission to negotiate, in liaison with the ECB, the economic policy conditions 
attached to each financial assistance, in accordance with Article 13(3);  
(c) change the pricing policy and pricing guideline for financial assistance, in accordance with Article 
20; 
In other words, fundamental decisions by the EMF, such as the provision of stability support, no 
longer require a unanimous vote (as was the case under the old Article 5(6)(f) ESMT); rather a 
reinforced qualified majority will suffice in the future. The same is true for the decision to request 
the Commission to negotiate the economic policy conditions attached to each financial assistance, 
as well as for the decision to change the pricing policy for financial assistance.96 
So does this amount to a major innovation enhancing the efficiency of the mechanism? We must 
not forget that even under the old system these decisions could be taken by a qualified majority 
of 85%. However, this was only possible under exceptional circumstances (‘emergency situations’): 
When both the Commission and the ECB had concluded that a failure to urgently adopt a decision 
to grant financial assistance would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro 
area, then the emergency voting procedure could be used. What used to be the exception (85% 
threshold) now becomes the rule. This will affect small states more negatively, as they can now be 
outvoted. Big states, such as Germany with a 27% share of all votes, retain their veto right, at least 
prima facie. On closer examination, it turns out that they, too, will lose their veto right in case the 
new emergency procedure applies.97 This new procedure is codified in Articles 3(2) and (4), which 
provide: 
(2) Where circumstances require the urgent provision of stability support to an EMF Member in 
accordance with Article 16, decisions may be taken by an emergency procedure. In such an event, 
the decision taken by the Board of Governors or the Board of Directors shall be transmitted to the 
Council immediately after its adoption together with the reasons on which it is based. Upon 
request of the Chairperson, the Council shall discuss the decision, within 24 hours of its 
transmission. The Council may object to the decision. In the event of an objection, the Council may 
itself adopt another decision on the matter, or refer the matter back to the Board of Governors for 
another decision.  
                                                 
95 Article 4 of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 3.  
96 See Article 5(7)(b)-(c) of the Draft Statute of the EMF supra note 55, at 3.  
97 An interesting question that arises in this context is who will decide that an emergency situation does exist. In 
contrast to the ESMT, the draft does not specify this.  
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[…] 
(4) Where the Council acts in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2, [...] the votes of members of the 
Council representing Member States whose currency is not the euro shall be suspended. A 
qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3) TFEU.98 
Under these provisions even big states such as Germany or France would lose their veto, as the 
Council decides on the basis of the qualified majority rules of Article 238(3) TFEU (55%/65%)99 and 
not the voting rules laid down in Article 4(4) of the draft Regulation (85%).100 This loss of veto power 
will raise complex constitutional issues in a number of Member States, such as Germany, where 
the Constitutional Court had recently decided that the loss of a veto right would not be compatible 
with the budgetary sovereignty of the German Parliament.101 The principle of democracy - as 
enshrined in Article 20 of the German Basic law - requires that the German Parliament remains the 
place in which autonomous decisions on revenue and expenditure are made, including those with 
regard to international liabilities.102 However, this will no longer be the case once the veto right is 
lost. This would interrupt the democratic legitimation nexus between the budgetary overall 
responsibility of the national parliament and the ESM/EMF. It would shift the democratic decision 
making process to the supranational level, where the European Parliament still plays a marginal 
role only (see above).103 
In sum, under the old system unanimity used to be the rule, whereas the 85% threshold was the 
exception (‘emergency procedure’). In contrast, under the new system the 85% threshold becomes 
the rule and the new exception lowers requirements even further (55%/65%). While that may 
accelerate the procedure and thereby enhance efficiency, it raises other serious problems: Most 
importantly, the new decision making procedure will lead to the loss of a veto right. This, in turn, 
has serious democratic implications and hence raises complex constitutional issues in states such 
as Germany. In light of these implications, it is highly questionable whether individual Member 
States and in particularly Germany will - and indeed can - support the proposal.  
3. More Democratic? Withdrawal from an International Treaty v. Repealing an EU 
Regulation 
The integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework will bring about another important legal 
change. As the ESMT constitutes an international treaty, a Member State can unilaterally withdraw 
from it according to Article 56 et seq. VCLT. Such unilateral withdrawal is no longer possible, once 
                                                 
98 Article 3(2) and 3(4) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 27. 
99 Note that the votes of the members of the council representing Member States whose currency is not the euro 
shall be suspended, see Article 3(4) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 5. 
100 See Article 3(4) COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 27. 
101 See 2 BvR 1390/12, Leitsatz: No. 4: ‘Die haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung des Deutschen Bundestages 
setzt voraus, dass der Legitimationszusammenhang zwischen dem Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus und 
dem Parlament unter keinen Umständen unterbrochen wird. [...] sicherzustellen, dass die gegenwärtig gegebene 
und verfassungsrechtlich geforderte Vetoposition der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auch unter veränderten 
Umständen erhalten bleibt‘ [‘In accordance with the general competence of the Parliament of German Federal 
Parliament to determine budgetary policy, the democratic legitimation of the European Stability Mechanism 
through the Parliament may not be impeded […] in order to guarantee that the currently existing and 
constitutionally required veto right of the Federal Republic of Germany remains intact also under changed 
circumstances.’]. 
102 See 2 BvR 1390/12. 
103 The role of national parliaments in the EMF is marginal, too, see Article 6 of the Draft COM (2017) 827 final. 
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the ESM is integrated into the EU legal framework. According to the actus contrarius doctrine, 
unanimity would be required to repeal the Regulation on the establishment of the EMF.104 Thus, 
Member States should be aware that once the EMF is established and integrated into the EU legal 
framework it will be very difficult to ‘escape’ its obligations. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Commission’s proposal faces a plethora of problems: First of all, it seems highly questionable 
whether the EU has indeed the competence to integrate the ESM into the EU legal framework. In 
particular, the invocation of Article 352 TFEU as legal base is not convincing for the reasons outlined 
above.  
Second, the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework will not render EMU any more 
democratic. The European Parliament continues to play a marginal role only – all it can do is to 
request annual reports by the EMF and to demand a hearing of the Managing Director.  
Third, efficiency may indeed be increased by changing the decision-making procedure. However, 
it comes at a cost of democratic legitimacy: The principle of democracy - as enshrined, inter alia, in 
Article 20 of the German Basic Law - requires that the German Parliament remains the place in 
which autonomous decisions on revenue and expenditure are made, including those with regard 
to international liabilities. However, this will no longer be the case once the veto right is lost (e.g. 
during the emergency procedure). This would interrupt the democratic legitimation nexus 
between the budgetary overall responsibility of the national parliament and the ESM/EMF. It would 
shift the decision making process to the supranational level, where the European Parliament still 
plays a marginal role only. In light of these implications it is highly questionable whether the 
individual Member States and in particularly Germany will – and indeed can – support the proposal, 
which requires unanimity.105  
 
                                                 
104 Provided Article 352 TFEU is indeed used – as proposed by the Commission – as the legal base for enacting said 
Regulation. 
105 At least if one accepts the Commission’s view that Article 352 TFEU is the appropriate legal base.  
